JUNHONG CHU, PRADEEP K. CHINTAGUNTA, and NAUFEL J. VILCASSIM* Evaluating proposed changes in channels of distribution and matching products to channels in multichannel product markets are difficult tasks for the management of any company. Such policy-oriented issues cannot be addressed easily by methods such as controlled experiments in test markets, which are feasible methods for evaluating pricing and advertising decisions, or by using historical sales/profits data. In this article, the authors show how the framework of structural modeling and policy simulations can be used to evaluate such policy changes. They also show how to assess the economic value of each channel to each firm and to its customers. They apply such policy simulations to the personal computer market, which is characterized by multiple firms competing through various channels using multiple products. The analysis quantifies the profit impact on firms and the welfare impact on consumers of many proposed channel actions and provides an economic rationale for different actions observed in this marketplace, such as decisions to add or drop marketing channels. The authors also simulate the effects of the Hewlett-Packard-Compaq merger but go beyond a standard merger analysis by evaluating the effects of various potential channel actions co-incident with the merger.
Assessing the Economic Value of Distribution Channels: An Application to the Personal Computer Industry welfare but also its relationships with channel intermediaries and other firms in the market. The issue of managing multiple channels along with multiple product lines is a particularly noteworthy aspect of the market for personal computers (PCs) because all PC makers offer multiple product lines through multiple distribution channels, and most customers, typically the highest-value customers, use multiple channels for shopping and purchasing (Yulinsky 2000) . As Forrester Research points out, "The ability to effectively support multi-channel marketing and sales will become more important as consumers gradually gravitate to the Internet" (Harwick 2002) . Consequently, there has been continuous channel restructuring in the PC market with firms entering into one channel or exiting others.
The same marketing channel may work well for one firm but not for another. When Dell started its online business in 1996, the response from customers was overwhelming (Rangan and Bell 1998) , but when Compaq decided to go direct, it faced resistance from its channel partners (Cassmir 1997) . Therefore, the questions are, Which channel works better for which firm, and how can the financial implications of changing the channel structure or channel-productline combinations be evaluated? Firms in multichannel, multiproduct settings must often decide which channel to enter, which channel to exit, and which product to sell in which channel. None of these are easy decisions because a firm's channel strategy is often intertwined with its product-line, market segmentation, positioning, and targeting strategies (Kotler 2000) . A firm's channel actions affect not only its own profits and customer Evaluating proposed changes in channels of distribution and the corresponding matching of products to channels is a difficult task for the management of any company. Unlike changes in other elements of the marketing mix, such as price, advertising, and many forms of promotions, the likely consequences of changes in channel structure cannot be easily determined by running localized experiments. Setting up distribution channels involves outside parties, and firms are often bound by contractual obligations that cannot be changed easily. The problem is made more difficult because historical sales/profit/margin data are of limited value because such data do not answer the question of what would happen if a distribution channel were eliminated or a product switched from one channel to another.
What, then, is the solution? Two recent articles (Bronnenberg, Rossi, and Vilcassim 2005; Franses 2005) argue that researchers in marketing should build appropriate models that allow for policy simulations with respect to changes in marketing actions. Bronnenberg, Rossi, and Vilcassim (2005) also outline the advantages of building "structural models" for policy simulations and assert that inadequate attention has been paid in the marketing literature to the issue of policy simulations. The goal of the current article is to show that policy simulations can be used to understand the economic consequences of changing a firm's channel/ product strategy. We develop a structural model that enables firms in the PC market to simulate the profit and welfare impact of changes in their channels and product mix.
In the PC market, the different distribution channels collectively serve both institutional and home segments. These channels differ in price, promotion, assortment, convenience, and services (e.g., Goolsbee 2001) . For the same product, consumers derive different utility and therefore shop across channels. Thus, changes in channels and/or product mix and variations in their matching affect consumer welfare, and it is important for firms to understand the implications of such changes. Whereas institutional customers can access all the channels, individual customers may not have access to some channels (e.g., value-added resellers [VARs] ). Instead of modeling the two segments separately, we account for such differences by incorporating heterogeneity in their channel preferences.
We follow recent developments in structural modeling in setting the framework for our policy simulations. We begin with a random coefficients logit model and thus account for consumer heterogeneity in preferences for brand, product attributes, and price response. This enables us to estimate a flexible brand and channel substitution pattern. Our pricing model accounts for both horizontal and vertical market interactions. Manufacturers play a Bertrand-Nash pricing game, maximizing product-line profits across all channels. Given a manufacturer-led Stackelberg leader-follower game between manufacturers and downstream firms, manufacturers also account for downstream firms' reaction functions in their pricing decisions. Because of the downstream complexity of the PC market, we assume that downstream firms apply a simple (unknown, but estimable) markup rule, which we show to be a reasonable approximation.
Using the estimated demand parameters, marginal costs, and downstream markups, we first estimate the economic value of channels to firms and consumers-that is, the profit impact on firms and the welfare impact on consumers associated with firms' channel actions. We then conduct a series of policy simulations, such as dropping a channel or a product line, adding a channel, and considering a merger between firms (Hewlett-Packard [HP] and Compaq) together with channel restructuring.
Our major contributions are as follows: First, we provide an approach to evaluate firms' channel policy changes in a multichannel, multiproduct setting. Second, we estimate a flexible and institutionally sensible channel substitution pattern. Third, we assess the economic value of channels to firms and to consumers. Fourth, we quantify the profit impact on firms and the welfare impact on consumers of a variety of proposed channel changes and thus provide an economic rationale for many observed channel actions.
Among our major findings are the following: First, channels with high (low) historical sales and profits do not necessarily have high (low) economic value to firms. Second, Dell's decision to exit the retail channel and Compaq's decision to go direct were economically justified, but Compaq needed to manage its relationships with channel partners carefully. Third, Gateway would be better off switching its retail sales to the Internet channel, a course of action that the firm has subsequently taken.
In the rest of the article, we briefly review the theoretical research on marketing channels and the empirical work that uses structural modeling for policy simulations, and we identify the shortcomings that must be addressed to capture certain institutional aspects of the PC market. We then present our data and model and discuss the estimation issues. We present the results and conclude with directions for further research.
BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
One stream of the literature on marketing channels has investigated the relationships between manufacturers and retailers to determine whether the former should be vertically integrated or decentralized and, if they are decentralized, what the competitive interactions are and how the channel can be coordinated vertically (e.g., Choi 1991; Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Lee and Staelin 1997) . As the importance of direct channels, particularly the Internet, has increased recently, the theoretical channel literature has focused on the interactions between a firm's direct and indirect channels (Desai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit 2004; Tsay and Agrawal 2004) . Although these studies provide valuable insights into issues such as channel coordination, they do not enable simulations to be performed in which the economic consequences of changes in channel policy can be quantified.
In another stream, researchers have used structural models to conduct various policy simulations. Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (2000) examine manufacturer × retailer channel interactions and the implications for channel pricing power. Berto Villas-Boas (2004) tests the vertical contracting between manufacturers and retailers using aggregate data. Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) study manufacturer × retailer interactions using individual-level data. However, these studies do not involve manufacturer interactions across multiple types of channels, nor do they study the issue of appropriately matching the firms' product lines with channels. Such multichannel, multiproduct approaches are some of the defining institutional aspects of the PC market. As Reiss and Wollak (2007) argue, if the analyses of firms' policy changes in such a market are to be meaningful, 1 Because no other innovative channels have emerged since 1998 and all the distribution channels we observe today already existed in that period, we can still use the 1995-1998 data to analyze firms' interactions across channels and to provide guidance for firms' channel reconfiguration in today's market. More important, by checking our simulation results against what happened subsequently in the marketplace, we can test the validity of our approach. a model must include in a reasonable manner such institutional realities. Therefore, in our model development, we account for (1) manufacturer interactions across different channels, (2) vertical interactions between manufacturers and downstream firms in the indirect channels, and (3) downstream firms' pricing behavior (albeit in a limited manner, but this nonetheless captures their behavior in practice).
Another issue of interest when analyzing the PC market is the understanding of the economic consequences of likely mergers, such as that between HP and Compaq. Such analysis has been popular in the recent literature (e.g., Nevo 2000) . We differ from these studies in that we do not simply investigate the profit and welfare impact of mergers but also combine mergers with firms' channel and product options.
DATA
The data we analyze are from the U.S. PC market for 1995-1998 and include retail prices and unit sales at the manufacturers' brand-model level across six different distribution channels. 1 Our data structure is as follows: At the top are manufacturers, such as Dell, Compaq, and Gateway. Each manufacturer has several brands, and each brand has a series of PC models, which together form a product line. For example, Dell has Dimension and Optiplex brands and multiple products within each brand (e.g., Dimension 3000, Dimension 4600), and therefore we have the Dimension and Optiplex product lines.
We focus on the top ten (by volume) PC manufacturers (see Table 1 ), which accounted for 89% of branded PC sales, with 70% sold to institutional buyers. Compaq had the largest PC sales (21% market share), followed by NEC/ Packard Bell (14%) and Dell (13%). The manufacturers experienced different sales trends over the years. Compaq, Gateway, and, in particular, Dell increased their market shares by large amounts, whereas shares of NEC/Packard Bell and Apple dropped substantially.
There are 74 PC brands or product lines with varying market shares. The six distribution channels are direct outbound, direct inbound, dealer/VAR/SI (systems integrators), retail, the Internet, and others. Direct outbound represents sales by a manufacturer's sales force, agents, or representatives. Direct inbound captures a manufacturer's telemarketing and catalog sales. Dealer/VAR/SIs, such as corporate account resellers and computer specialty dealers, focus on sales to large-volume buyers. The retail channel refers to storefront companies that sell to a large number of unrelated customers. Internet direct sales refer to sales through the manufacturers' Web sites. Indirect channels reflect the bulk of PC sales: 35% of PCs are sold through dealer/VAR/SI, and 31% are sold in the retail channel. Direct inbound and outbound channels account for 28% of PC sales. From 1995 to 1998, dealer/VAR/SI shares dropped from 38% to 31%, and retail shares dropped from 37% to 28%, whereas direct outbound shares increased from 8% to 12%, and direct inbound shares increased from 15% to 20%. Internet sales began in 1998 and had less than 1% of the total PC sales. Given the low Internet penetration in our data, our conclusions about this channel are necessarily limited.
All manufacturers used multiple channels to market their products, but different manufacturers focused on different channels. Dell, Gateway, and Micron primarily used direct marketing channels; specifically, Dell focused on direct outbound, and the latter two focused on direct inbound. NEC/ Packard Bell used the retail channel, and HP, IBM, Acer, and Compaq focused on the dealer/VAR/SI channel (see Table 2 ).
Sales breakdown by channel at the brand level reveals that each product line has a "primary" channel. For example, Compaq sold 90% of Presario PCs through retail channels, 85% of HiNote through dealer/VAR/SI channels, and 99% of ProSignia through catalog and Internet channels. These product-line-channel arrangements help the firm match customer preference for the product line with that for the channel and thus help reduce intrabrand competition across channels and better coordinate the firm's channel relationships.
MODEL FORMULATION

Model Setup
To evaluate firms' channel and product-line options, we require a demand system with the following features: First, it must be derived from individual consumers' utilitymaximizing behavior to avoid the "Lucas critique" when used for policy simulations (see Lucas 1976 ; see also Franses 2005) . Second, it must reflect consumer heterogeneity in channel preferences to allow for differential access to the channels for institutional and individual buyers. Third, it must generate flexible substitution patterns. Fourth, it must be parsimonious in the model parameters.
We use the random coefficients logit model because it meets these criteria (for a full discussion, see Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2000 Nevo , 2001 . Retail prices are the outcomes of vertical interactions between manufacturers and channel members (in the indirect channels) and of horizontal interactions between manufacturers and channel members. Given that we observe only retail prices, we cannot estimate the nature of vertical relationships in addition to marginal costs and wholesale prices as is done in studies such as that of Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (2000) . The channels literature (e.g., Choi 1991; Sudhir 2001) proposes that it is plausible to assume a manufacturer-led Stackelberg leader-follower game structure between manufacturers and downstream firms. We adopt this for several reasons. First, it is consistent with the timing of the game because usually the manufacturers set wholesale prices and downstream firms set retail prices on the basis of the wholesale prices. Second, we focus on the top ten manufacturers, so we can reasonably argue that they have some channel power. Under this assumption, manufacturers set wholesale prices while taking into account the reaction functions of downstream firms that set retail prices as a function of wholesale prices. We assume that manufacturers maximize product-line profits given their marginal costs and that their horizontal interaction is Bertrand-Nash pricing. The Bertrand-Nash assumption seems justified given the competitive nature of the PC industry (e.g., Economides 1998) .
To obtain the reaction functions of the downstream firms, the typical assumption is that retailers set prices to maximize category profits given wholesale prices (e.g., Berto Villas-Boas 2004; Sudhir 2001). Two reasons preclude such an approach in the PC market. First, there is a large number of downstream firms whose horizontal interactions must be modeled. Second, the downstream problem is further complicated by the presence of exclusive and nonexclusive channel members that carry various subsets of the manufacturers' products. Because our data are aggregated at each retail channel, not at each retail firm level, we cannot know what product lines each downstream firm carries, which makes a uniform definition of the downstream firms' profit maximization through product-line pricing difficult to characterize. Rather than model their decisions explicitly, we assume that downstream firms in the indirect channels charge a (unknown but estimable) brand-model-, channel-, 2 When is such a rule optimal for a downstream firm? If the firm maximizes profits separately for each brand model, retail price = wholesale price × (1 + 1/[-ε -1]), where ε is the price elasticity of demand. To account for deviations from single-product profit maximization and for retail competition, we can write retail price as wholesale price
, where θ reflects the effects of such deviations. As long as θ/(ε + 1) does not vary significantly with prices, the markup rule is optimal for the retail firm. Cost-plus pricing is still empirically the most commonly observed pricing rule (Hanson 1992) . We interviewed PC retailers that considered percentage markups commonplace. We also obtained some independent verification on our estimates because of the closeness of our downstream markup estimates and those reported by Gartner. and time-specific markup. 2 Combining the manufacturer and retailer pricing decisions, we can write retail prices as a function of manufacturers' marginal costs and downstream firms' markups, both of which are unobserved but can be estimated from the data.
Random Coefficients Logit Demand Model
As in Sudhir's (2001) and Berto Villas-Boas's (2004) studies, we assume that consumers choose a PC brandmodel-channel combination. A PC brand j together with a form factor (desktop/laptop) f and a microprocessor k makes a PC model ω. With 74 brands (J), five processors (K), three form factors (F), and six distribution channels (D), there is a total of 8542 choice alternatives in the four years (T) under consideration. The conditional indirect utility that consumer i derives from purchasing model ω from channel d in year t is given by where α ij , α ik , α if , and α id are intrinsic preferences for brand, central processing unit (CPU), form factor, and channel, respectively; α t is year trend; β i is price coefficient or marginal utility of income; Y it is income; ξ ωdt is unobserved (to the econometrician) product attributes; and ε iωdt is the idiosyncratic utility factor. The effects of product attributes and price coefficient vary across consumers as follows:
α idã nd Given that there are 74 brands, it is computationally infeasible to specify even a diagonal variance-covariance matrix for the brand preference intercepts α ij with brand-specific distributions. We assume that the brand intercepts follow independent but not identical normal distributions with
brand-specific location parameters but manufacturer-specific scale parameters, for ∀j v. We use brand-specific mean preferences, , for two reasons: (1) It produces a better model fit than the specification with manufacturer-specific location and scale parameters, and (2) because we are examining manufacturers' channel and product-line options, using brand-level parameter estimates better quantifies the impact of changes in product lines. Note that even with the aforementioned covariance structure, the aggregate substitution pattern across products will be flexible given that brand models share manufacturers, microprocessors, form factors, and distribution channels to varying degrees.
The utility of the outside good is u i0t = α i0 + β i Y it + ε i0t , where α i0 is set to zero for identification purposes. Defining
we can write the indirect utility as u iωdt = δ ωdt + μ iωdt + ε iωdt . We assume that ε iωdt follow an extreme value distribution, which gives rise to the following logit choice probability:
The unconditional market share of PC model ω in channel d and year t is
Manufacturers' Product-Line Pricing
Under the Bertrand-Nash pricing assumption, each manufacturer v takes the other manufacturers' prices as given and maximizes product-line profits across all channels (D vt ) by jointly setting wholesale prices of its PC models in all channels. Manufacturer v's profit function in year t is where mc ωdt is the marginal cost for model ω in channel d in year t, M t is the market size, and FC vt is manufacturer v's fixed cost in year t. The first-order conditions under the Bertrand-Nash assumption are The manufacturer's pricing equations are where, S t , P t w , and MC t are vectors of shares, wholesale prices, and manufacturer marginal costs, respectively, and Δ wt is the matrix of first derivatives of shares with respect to
wholesale prices, or the manufacturer's response matrix, with the (ωd v , ω′d v ′)th element defined as We define Δ rt as the matrix of first derivatives of shares with respect to retail prices, or the retailer's response matrix, with the (ωd v , ω′d v ′)th element as and we define Δ t as the matrix of first derivatives of retail prices with respect to wholesale prices, with the (ωd v , ω′d v ′)th element as Thus, Δ t is downstream firms' reaction functions. By the chain rule, Δ wt = Δ t Δ rt . The manufacturer's pricing equations are Here, we do not observe P t w , MC t , Δ t , or Δ rt . They need to be determined from the model estimates.
Downstream Firms' Pricing
We assume a simple downstream markup rule for products sold in the indirect channels as and as r ωdt = 0 for products sold through direct channels. In matrix form, downstream firms' pricing equations are where R t is the vector of downstream markups.
Final Pricing Equations
With downstream firms' pricing equations (Equation 8), matrix Δ t becomes a diagonal matrix, diag{1 + r 11t , ..., 1 + Substituting manufacturers' pricing equations into downstream firms' pricing equations and after some mathematical manipulation, we have the final pricing equations:
In the pricing equations (Equation 9), both R t and MC t are not known and need to be estimated from the model with the data. We discuss the identification issue in the "Estimation" section.
Measuring Consumer Welfare: Compensating Variation
A research objective is to measure the change in consumer welfare associated with firms' channel and productline changes. A popular welfare measure in the context of discrete choice models is the Hicksian, or compensating variation (CV), which captures the dollar amount by which consumers need to be compensated to maintain the same level of utility after a channel or another choice alternative is eliminated (Chintagunta, Dubé, and Singh 2003) . Specifically, we denote individual i's utility net of the extreme value taste shock as V i (V i = δ ωdt + μ iωdt ). If channel d is removed, this changes a customer's valuations for each alternative from V 0 to V 1 . As Small and Rosen (1981) derive, if we hold the individual marginal value of income constant, we can compute individual i's associated change in welfare as
The numerator in Equation 10 captures the difference between the expected maximum utility under the two channel structures. Dividing the utility difference by the marginal utility of income makes the change money metric. We can compute the expected aggregate change in consumer utility by integrating over the distribution of consumer heterogeneity:
ESTIMATION Estimation of Demand Parameters
We follow the estimation method in recent empirical work (e.g., Nevo 2001) and adopt a two-step sequential approach. This ensures that the possible misspecification of pricing models will not contaminate the demand parameter estimates. We first estimate the parameters of the demand equations. We use the number of office-based employees in each year (60 million) as the market size and use a standard instrumental variables technique to account for potential price endogeneity. We use three sets of manufacturer cost shifters as instruments: (1) product characteristics, including dummies for brand, form factor, microprocessor, and time; (2) costs of goods sold (COGS) per dollar sales from the COMPUSTAT database; and (3) producer price index for microprocessor and memory. We interact producer price index with brand dummies. These instruments explain 69% of price variations.
Estimation of Pricing Parameters and Identification Assumption
We use the estimated demand parameters to estimate marginal costs, downstream markups, and wholesale prices as follows: First, we estimate the retail response matrix Δ rt . We use a Monte Carlo method to simulate Δ rt with the same set of draws as in the demand estimation. Second, we compute marginal costs and downstream markups using Equation 9. Third, we estimate wholesale prices, P t w = P t /(1 + R t ).
A challenge in estimating the parameters in the pricing equations is that we observe only retail prices but need to estimate two vectors of unknowns, MC t and R t . We use the unique channel structure in the PC market-the same PC models are sold through direct channels and indirect channels-to identify these two vectors by assuming symmetric PC model-level marginal costs across direct and indirect channels. Specifically, we assume that PC model ω's marginal costs in the retail and dealer/VAR/SI channels equal the mean marginal cost of model ω sold in the direct channels in the same year, so we estimate a model-, channel-, and year-specific marginal cost. If a model is sold only through indirect channels, which occurred only for four small brands with a total market share of .58%, we match its marginal costs to another brand with the same microprocessor, form factor, and manufacturer in that year.
Let ≡ (1 + R t )MC t be the vector of unknowns, where MC are products sold in the direct channels (the corresponding R = 0) and R are products sold in indirect channels (we assume that the corresponding MC are equal to the mean MC for the same models sold in the direct channels). We can compute these unknowns by solving the system of non- (Equation 9). Note that we cannot first estimate MC for products sold in the direct channels and then match them to products sold in the indirect channels to obtain the corresponding R, because this would require us to assume that the manufacturers maximize profits from direct channels and indirect channels separately. Because we assume that manufacturers maximize profits across direct and indirect channels jointly, we must estimate the MC and R in Equation 9 simultaneously.
Policy Simulations
With the estimates of demand parameters, marginal costs, and downstream markups, we conduct policy simulations. For each simulation, we first compute the new equilibrium prices and shares by simultaneously solving the system of demand equations (Equation 3) and the corresponding pricing equations; then, we compute changes in firm profits and consumer welfare. When solving this system of equations, if a product line is switched from a direct channel to another direct channel, we set the intrinsic channel preference parameter for this product line in the origin channel to equal the channel preference parameter of the destination channel. If a product line is switched or extended from an indirect channel to a direct channel, in addition to adjusting the intrinsic channel preference parameter, we set the downstream markup levels to zero for that product line to be sold in the direct channel. If a product line is switched or extended from a direct channel to an indirect channel, in addition to adjusting the intrinsic channel preference parameter, we set the downstream markup levels for the product line to equal the markup levels of the same product line in another indirect channel. For the merger simulations, we carry out the computation by assuming that Compaq and HP maximize their joint profits. (The technical details for the policy simulations are available on request.)
We compute manufacturers' profit changes on the basis of the wholesale prices and shares and downstream profit changes on the basis of the retail prices, wholesale prices, and shares in the new scenario. When a channel is dropped from a manufacturer's distribution system, its profit changes consist of two parts: (1) the forgone profits from the product lines in that channel, which equal the historical profits, and (2) the profit change from the products in the remaining channels, which depends on consumers' channel substitution patterns. When a product line is switched from one channel to another, the change in profit is the difference in profits under the two channel-product structures. Similarly, we can estimate changes in downstream profits. We compute compensation variation for each individual and integrate it over the distribution to obtain the welfare change for the consumer population.
RESULTS
Demand Estimates
We report the demand parameters from ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS), and mixed logit in Table 3 . For space reasons, we report only preference estimates for CPU, form factor, channel, and time trend, along with the mean price response. All 74 mean intrinsic brand preference parameters are highly significant in all three cases: |t| > 12 for the OLS model, |t| > 8 for the 2SLS model, and |t| > 5 for the mixed logit model. The last two columns report the estimates for the heterogeneity Table 3 LOGIT MODEL RESULTS
Mixed Logit OLS 2SLS
parameters and their standard errors. We find that several product attributes have statistically significant effects on demand, as do the channel dummies. Customers are heterogeneous in their preferences for brand, Apple processor, distribution channel, and form factor and in their price sensitivity. Accounting for customer heterogeneity results in a higher estimate of the price sensitivity parameter; specifically, the mean elasticity estimate increases from -2.56 (2SLS) to -3.56 (mixed logit). A key output of our demand analysis that forms the basis of our policy simulations is the substitution pattern across channels and manufacturers. Table 4 reports the channel substitution patterns. We find considerable asymmetry in the nature of these patterns. Furthermore, the substitution patterns are intuitively plausible and institutionally sensible. Direct channels primarily compete among themselves, as do indirect channels. Direct inbound and Internet channels are essentially the same marketing tool, and they have the highest cross-elasticity. The substitution between direct and indirect channels is also substantial. When the dealer/VAR/ SI channel changes prices, it affects all other channels because this channel primarily serves institutional customers, who also have access to other channels.
In Table 5 , we report the substitution pattern across manufacturers. We observe that the substitution pattern seems plausible. For example, Compaq and HP have the Notes: We determined the effect of a 1% change in a column channel's price on a row channel's shares. We computed elasticities for each observation and report means across observations. highest cross-price elasticity, implying that they are primary competitors. This is consistent with the industry observers' concerns that the HP-Compaq merger would lead to price increases because of the reduction in competition. When Dell changes prices, of the direct sellers, it affects Compaq and HP the most, which is consistent with the motivation for HP and Compaq to merge-that is, to compete with Dell. The direct seller Gateway primarily competes with another direct seller, Micron. As is the asymmetric channel substitution pattern, the manufacturer substitution pattern is also asymmetric. IBM has the greatest impact on the sales of Apple and HP, Apple has the greatest impact on NEC and Toshiba, and HP has the greatest impact on Compaq. Table 6 reports the imputed wholesale prices, channel margin, manufacturer margin, and downstream firm markups by channel. For the direct channels, wholesale prices are the same as retail prices. Wholesale prices for the dealer/VAR/SI and the retail channels are lower than those in the direct channels because manufacturers must yield some profits to channel partners. Note that the marginal cost estimates vary across channel because of differences in PC products sold in the different channels. The Internet has the lowest marginal costs primarily because its major sellers are low-cost manufacturers, such as Dell and Gateway, and because by 1998, when Internet sales began, costs had already declined.
Estimates for Marginal Costs and Downstream Markups
On average, the direct and indirect channels have approximately the same percentage margins-31% and 29%, respectively. However, manufacturers enjoy only a 17% margin in the indirect channels, much lower than that in the direct channels. The Internet has the highest channel margin of 35%, followed by direct outbound (32%), and the retail channel has the lowest channel margin (26%) and the lowest manufacturer margin (14%). Downstream firms have an average markup of 16.9% (the r in the model specification) over wholesale prices, with 17.4% for the dealer/VAR/ SI channel and 16.1% for the retail channel.
We report the imputed wholesale prices, marginal costs, and margins for the manufacturers in Table 7 . The total product channel margins range from 23.9% for NEC/ Packard Bell to 38.2% for Dell, and the total manufacturer margins range from 17.2% to 35.3%. Downstream firms have markups from 11.9% for Micron products to 20.5% for IBM products. From a manufacturer's perspective, selling direct is much more profitable than selling indirect because the manufacturer retains all the channel margins by selling direct. Manufacturers have an average of 30.8% margin in the direct channels but only 16.7% in the indirect channels, which is 46% lower. NEC/Packard Bell's and Toshiba's margins from indirect channels are less than half of those of the direct channels. This might help explain why the direct sellers, such as Dell, have been so successful whereas the indirect sellers have experienced great difficulty in competing with their direct counterparts.
The rank ordering of the manufacturer margin estimates is consistent with views in the popular press, which heavily tout the Dell business model and direct selling (e.g., DiCarlo 2001). Dell and Gateway enjoy the highest manufacturer margin because their products are sold primarily Notes: Channel margin = (retail price -marginal cost)/retail price. Manufacturer margin = (wholesale price -marginal cost)/wholesale price. Downstream markup (r) = (retail price -wholesale price)/wholesale price. 5 This is primarily caused by the changes in the mix of indirect channels in these two periods. The dealer/VAR/SI channel has a higher imputed margin than the retail channel; therefore, the higher the dealer/VAR/SI sales, the higher is the overall downstream margin. The dealer/VAR/SI channel accounts for 64.9% and 58.7% of sales for IBM and HP in 1995-1998 , whereas these numbers dropped to 48. 0% and 29.1% in 1999-2003 . Therefore, the imputed 1995-1998 margins for these two firms tended to be on the high side compared with the observed 1999-2003 margins. through direct channels. Toshiba has the highest retail prices and the second-highest wholesale prices, but its manufacturer margin is the second lowest because of high marginal cost and indirect selling. NEC/Packard Bell has the lowest manufacturer margin because of its low price and indirect selling, which might foretell its withdrawal from the U.S. market a few years later. Our manufacturer margin estimates are also consistent with numbers from other sources. For example, Compaq's 1998 PC gross margin was 25%, and our 1995-1998 period estimate is 24.9%. 3 Apple's 1998 gross margin was 24.8%, and our 1995-1998 estimate is 23.6%. 4 To verify the plausibility of the downstream markup estimates, we compare them with the numbers from Gartner for the U.S. PC market for the 1999-2003 period. Because these data contain both wholesale and retail prices, we can compute actual downstream markups. The reported downstream markups are stable over time at 15.1%, 15.1%, 15.1%, 15.0%, and 14.9%, respectively, for these five years, and our estimates (16.9%) are within half a standard deviation of the observed ones. As for the downstream markups by downstream firm type, our estimates are nearly identical for the retail channel and within one standard deviation for the VAR channel. As for the downstream markups by manufacturer, they are nearly identical for Acer and NEC; within half or one standard deviation for Gateway, Apple, Compaq, Dell, and Toshiba; and within two standard deviations for HP and IBM. 5 The high consistency of our downstream markup estimates with those from a separate commercial data source gives us confidence in the model parameter estimates.
Robustness Checks
We conducted a series of robustness checks on our model setup and on our major assumptions. First, given the data structure, we tried different nested logit models with channel, manufacturer, brand, CPU, and form factor at different levels of the nest. With aggregate data, the nested logit model primarily serves to provide a more flexible substitution pattern across alternatives than the standard logit model. Because we achieve the same objective through the random coefficients specification, there are no significant benefits from using the nested logit in our case. McFadden and Train (2000) show that the mixed logit model can approximate any arbitrary distribution for the underlying choice model. Second, we do not model the dynamics of competition but capture a snapshot of it. To check the stability of our estimates, we reestimated the model by dropping the last year of the data, the only year with the Internet. We found that the results are stable, which gives us some assurance that the dynamic effects, though present, do not overwhelm the other effects in the model. Third, we tried to model downstream competition in two extreme cases; we assumed that all downstream firms were exclusive dealers and that all downstream firms carried all manufacturers' products. Neither worked well with the data. We recognize that there might be some intermediate arrangements that could fit the data better. However, with so many manufacturers and downstream firms, it is difficult to try out all possible intermediate plans. Fourth, we tested various interaction effects-channel × time, manufacturer × channel, and manufacturer × time-and found that they did not improve our demand model. Fifth, we tried to specify manufacturer location/manufacturer scale and brand location/brand scale. The former had a poorer model fit than the current specification and was not flexible enough for our policy simulations. The latter was computationally infeasible because of the large number of brands. Therefore, we took an intermediate approach. This was a compromise between model flexibility and computational feasibility.
In the estimation, we used the Monte Carlo method to simulate the multiple integral for market share. We experimented with different numbers of draws until the results did not change much with a further increase in simulation draws. The estimates are also robust to the choice of market size. To test whether our estimates are sensitive to the instruments used, we reestimated the model by dropping COGS. The mean elasticity was close to that which we obtained using COGS as instrument, but dropping COGS led to larger standard errors. To identify the model parameters in the pricing equations, we assumed symmetric marginal costs across direct and indirect channels. A manufacturer's marginal costs consist of production cost and distribution cost. We can reasonably assume that the former is the same across direct and indirect channels, but the latter may vary across channels. To check robustness to this assumption, we recomputed the economic value of the direct channels to firms by assuming that the marginal costs in the direct channels were 10% or 15% higher than the levels in the indirect channels, as a result of the manufacturer taking on some of the retailer's channel functions. As we expected, the economic value of direct channels is reduced if marginal costs in the direct channels are higher than the current levels. However, the substantive nature of our results remains largely unchanged.
Policy Simulations
Given our data, there are several caveats to our subsequent policy simulations. First, we do not account for fixed costs and other costs, because we do not observe these costs. Nevertheless, firms can still use this approach because unlike us, they would have access to these costs. Second, because our data cover only one year of Internet sales, our conclusions about the Internet are tentative. Third, a key assumption in our analysis is that downstream markups do not change with the simulation scenarios. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption because the observed downstream markups from the Gartner data are stable over the 1999-2003 period.
Economic value of distribution channels. To assess the economic value of a distribution channel to a manufacturer, we drop this channel from a particular manufacturer's distribution system, and using the estimated model parameters, we recompute equilibrium prices and shares under the new distribution system and calculate changes in the manufacturer's profits. To assess the economic value of a distribution channel to consumers, we drop the channel from all manufacturers' distribution systems, compute equilibrium prices and shares, and then compute the compensating variation (see Table 8 ).
Economically, the most valuable channel to Compaq and HP is retail, even though both firms have more sales in the dealer/VAR/SI channel. The asymmetric switching across channels primarily causes this. When the dealer/VAR/SI channel is not available, the previous customers are more likely to switch to other channels for the firm's products. However, when the retail channel is not available, customers seem to stop buying the firm's products. Dealer/ VAR/SI is the most valuable channel to IBM and Apple, which also have the most sales from this channel. Direct outbound is the most valuable channel to Dell, and direct inbound is the most valuable channel to Gateway and Micron.
A noteworthy observation in Table 8 is the negative economic value of the retail channel to Gateway, implying that Gateway would be better off if this channel were removed from its distribution system. This is consistent with Gateway's action a few years later when it exited the retail channel. We are able to obtain this implication even with data several years before Gateway actually closed its retail outlets.
The most valuable channel to individual customers is retail, even though its market share is second to the dealer/ VAR/SI channel. This is caused by the asymmetric substitution pattern across channels. Dealer/VAR/SI primarily serves the institution customers, which also have access to other channels. Therefore, when this channel is not available, its customers can switch to other channels and thus have a lower surplus loss. Conversely, individual customers have fewer channel options, and retail was their primary channel during the 1995 -1998 period (Forrester Research Technographics 99, cited in Goolsbee 2001 . If this channel were not available, they might need to drop out of the market and thus have larger surplus loss.
How will rivals and downstream firms be affected if a given manufacturer's channel were removed? We find that removal of any channel would benefit rival PC makers because of lowering of competition, and removal of direct channels would benefit downstream firms, but removal of indirect channels would hurt them. In all cases, however, consumers would be worse off with a channel removal.
Dropping a product line in its entirety or from a channel. Manufacturers usually incur losses when their product lines are dropped entirely or from some channels. The losses are smaller than historical profits because some customers will buy the firm's other products in the channel or the same products from other channels. In Table 9 , we report such results for select combinations of product lines and channels. IBM would incur $573 million in losses if its entire ThinkPad line were eliminated, $249 million in losses if the ThinkPad line were eliminated from the Dealer/VAR/SI channel, and $110 million in losses if it were removed from the direct inbound channel. The historical profits are $726 million, $388 million, and $119 million, respectively. Rival manufacturers always benefit from the removal of a manufacturer's product line because of lower competition. Downstream firms benefit if a product line is dropped from a direct channel because some of the previous customers of the product line will switch to the indirect channels, but they get hurt when a product line is dropped from an indirect channel because of direct profit losses. The removal of a product line always leads to welfare losses because of less variety. From these policy experiments, firms can evaluate the value of each product line and each product-linechannel combination and thus decide the best product-linechannel mix. Notes: We computed standard errors through the bootstrapping method; these are available on request. a We used compensating variation to measure consumer welfare. A positive value implies that consumers are worse off because they need that amount of compensation to be as well off as they were previously.
Adding a channel to a distribution system. Distribution channels differ greatly in manufacturer margin and in consumers' intrinsic channel preferences. Manufacturers enjoy higher margins from the direct channels, but direct channels have much lower sales in the period considered and thus enjoy lower consumer intrinsic preference than the indirect channels. When a channel is added to a manufacturer's distribution system, the manufacturer needs to balance these two opposing factors. We simulate various channel-adding strategies for Dell, Compaq, and Gateway and present the results in Table 10 .
Dell entered the retail channel in 1990 and exited in 1994 (a period preceding our data) because of heavy losses. Through policy simulation, we can check whether Dell's retail decision was economically justified. We add the retail channel to Dell's distribution system by switching the Dimension line from direct outbound, by switching the Optiplex line from direct inbound, and by extending the Inspiron line from direct outbound into the retail channel by assuming that the retail channel has the same markups as the dealer/VAR/SI channel for Dell's products. From Table  10 , we find that if Dell were to switch any of its current product lines from the direct channels to the retail channel, it would be worse off by several million dollars. Extending product lines from the direct channels to the retail channel slightly increases Dell's profits, but if these profits cannot recover the fixed costs associated with entering the retail channel, Dell would be better off not entering offline retailing.
One of the major channel strategy shifts for Compaq in the late 1990s was to move toward direct selling. We simulate changes in Compaq's profits by switching or extending product lines from indirect channels to direct channels. Switching product lines from the retail channel to the Internet or extending product lines from the Dealer/VAR/SI channel to the direct inbound channel would increase Compaq's profits substantially. When Compaq decided to sell direct, its dealers were concerned about the move (Greenberg 2000) . Our policy simulations demonstrate that dealers' worries are well grounded because any proposed move of going direct would lead to huge losses for the downstream firms. For example, if Armada were extended from Dealer/VAR/SI to direct inbound, downstream firms would incur a profit loss of $111 million. 6 Compaq's decision to sell direct was economically justified, but it needed to take measures to coordinate its relationships with its channel partners. It is noteworthy that we are able to obtain these implications even with data before Compaq actually migrated channels.
Gateway's big channel strategy shift was to close all its retail outlets and use third-party retailers to sell its products. We have already shown that Gateway's own retail outlets were a net loss to the firm, but are there better channel options than using third-party retailers? Our results show that Gateway would have higher profits by switching retail sales to the Internet. If Gateway directs all retail sales to the Internet, its total profits would increase by $73 million even with the low intrinsic preference for the Internet during that period. Consumers are better off when a product line is extended to another channel because of more choices or when product lines are switched from the retail channel to the Internet. However, they are worse off with the proposed switching of product lines from direct outbound or direct inbound to retail.
Merger of Compaq and HP. Analyses of mergers have always been an important area for both researchers and antitrust authorities. The U.S. PC industry has experienced significant mergers in recent years. The $25 billion HPCompaq merger in 2002 was the computer industry's largest-ever deal and created a PC company that would be competitive with IBM and Dell. The merger will "allow the new company to effect 'economies of scale' and develop a more effective business structure along the lines of rival PCmanufacturer Dell" (CNN.com 2001) .
Given that our data predate the actual merger and that the PC industry changed considerably during the period of the merger, our analysis of the merger needs to be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we simulate the potential impact on all parties involved-the new company, rival firms, and customers under various postmerger channel actions. The results appear in Table 11 . The merger results in significant market power for the new company in raising prices and thus increasing its profits. Compaq-HP product prices would increase by 2% to 11%, and the merger alone would increase profits by $1.1 billion in the 1995-1998 period. This is consistent with predictions on postmerger price change by industry analysts at IDC and Gartner (see Bui 2001; Margevicius et al. 2002, respectively) and with the expectations of the management of the two companies, as highlighted in the press releases (see HP 2002a, b).
A major driver for the merger is for the combined company to be able to emulate Dell's business model. We tested this by moving sales from the indirect channels to the direct channels after the merger. All proposed going-direct moves would lead to profit increases for the merged company. For example, if the new company were to switch all Compaq dealer/VAR/SI sales to direct outbound, the company's total profits would increase by $3.5 billion. Note that we model only the gains from merging the PC business, and we ignore the various costs involved in integrating the two firms and other institutional issues, such as compatibility of corporate cultures. Thus, our results should be viewed as providing an indication of the gains from merging the PC business. The merger creates stronger competition for other PC makers. The merger alone would lead to $2.2 billion losses to other PC makers in these years. The losses would be higher if the new company moves sales from indirect to direct channels. The merger would result in huge consumer welfare losses due to price increases, but some of that loss would be mitigated if accompanied by a channel restructuring after the merger. Our computations assume that rival PC makers take no actions other than choosing the new equilibrium prices. In reality, however, they are likely to take other measures to counteract the adverse merger effect (e.g., introduce new products). Nevertheless, subject to such caveats, our results indicate that though the merger would greatly benefit the two firms involved, its effect on rivals and customers would be in the opposite direction.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We examined manufacturers' distribution channel and product-line options in the PC industry. We estimated a structural demand and pricing model and used the estimated model parameters to conduct a series of policy experiments on manufacturers' channel and product-line options, as well as a Compaq-HP merger, by considering various postmerger channel actions. Our results provide economic rationales for many observed channel actions. For example, we find that Dell's decision to exit offline retailing and Compaq's decision to sell direct were economically justified, but Compaq needed to address its relationships with downstream firms more carefully. We also find that Gateway would be better off by switching retail sales to the Internet, a course of action the company subsequently chose.
Our research is not only of academic interest but also of managerial significance to firms that are considering restructuring their channels. Our approach is also useful for rival firms that are interested in understanding the impact of a competing manufacturer's channel-mix change. We tested the viability of the proposed approach to the PC industry, and this approach can be applied to other industries with similar channel structures.
A potential direction for further research is to examine the importance of the Internet as a sales channel in the PC industry. Our data cover only the beginning of the Internet. Research is needed with data that cover a longer period of online sales. With such data, we could measure timevarying preferences for channels and potentially forecast these preferences to examine the long-term impact of the Internet on the PC distribution channels. Another potential area of research is to model downstream competition in the PC industry, which can be implemented with more detailed information on downstream firms.
To conclude, we believe that this research attempts to fill a void that Franses (2005) and Bronnenberg, Rossi, and Vilcassim (2005) note exists in the research literature on using models for marketing policy analyses at the firm level. We focused on a single industry and provided some insights into how marketing channels and product lines can be combined to enhance the performance of firms and to determine the effect of these options on customer welfare. We hope that our findings spur other researchers to explore such policy analyses in other markets with different institutional arrangements. 
